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I. INTRODUCTION
The Argentine legal system does not include a general codi-
fied set of rules applicable to Internet issues. As in other areas,
such as trade secrets and unfair competition, the law of the
Internet has evolved in Argentina initially by means of the appli-
cation and adjustment of general rules included in the Civil Code
and in other statutes, and thereafter through specific statutes
which address certain areas of the law of the Internet, such as
electronic signatures.'
* Partner, Cabanellas, Etchebarne & Kelly Abogados, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Licenciate in Economics (1971) and Lawyer (1972), National University of Buenos
Aires, M.C.L. (1975) and J.S.D. (1978), University of Illinois. Adjunct Professor,
University of Illinois; Professor, National University of Buenos Aires.
1. With regard to the general development of the law of the Internet in Argentina
see the following: MAURIcIO DEVOTO, COMERCIO ELECTR6NICO Y FIRMA DIGITAL: LA
REGULACION DEL CIBERESPACIO Y LAS ESTRATEGIAS GLOBALES (2001); HoRAcio
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There are several reasons behind this approach. One has
been that the speed with which Internet use has spread in Argen-
tina cannot be matched by the normal procedures of statutory
development. The Internet creates issues and problems in some of
the most controversial and conflictive areas of Argentine law, such
as patents, copyright and financial regulation. It is not possible to
reach a consensus about the appropriate treatment for Internet
activities in these areas so as to legislate with the speed necessary
to keep up with Internet phenomena. The result has been that
the legal status quo has been maintained in many areas not
because of any underlying policy behind such conservatism, but
simply because of the impossibility of reaching agreements as to
what the desirable changes should be.
A second reason behind the approach followed by Argentine
law has to do with the general structure of civil law systems gen-
erally and of Argentine law in particular. Civil law systems are
based on a normative structure of an extremely abstract nature,
which is in principle applicable to any type of human conduct or
transaction. This basic structure is then adjusted to specific situa-
tions by means of more concrete statutory rules, and by means of
administrative regulations and case law. Theoretically, the basic
general structure can withstand the challenge of new technologi-
cal developments, and it is the role of case law to make the neces-
sary adjustments to the system in order to make it viable in the
context of specific conflicts and transactions.
This methodology for adjustment has worked reasonably well
in some areas. For example, tort law is codified in seventy-one
sections of the Civil Code, most of which date back to the original
version of such Code, enacted in 1869. This basic structure has
survived major technological, economic and social upheavals, with
only minor statutory modifications. It would be a gross mistake,
however, to believe that tort law, as a whole, has remained as sta-
ble as the Civil Code on which it is based. On the contrary, a veri-
table flood of case law continuously changes the way Argentine
tort law is applied, and only through multi-volume treatises is it
possible to have a general idea of how Argentine tort law really
works.
Nevertheless, this type of adjustment to new circumstances is
not always possible. Software law provides a good example of how
the resistance to adjust the basic structure of Argentine statutory
FERNANDEZ DELPECH, INTERNET: SU PROBLEMATICA JURIDICA (2001); RIcARDo
LORENZETTI, COMERCIO ELECTRONICO (2001).
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law to new technological developments can result in insurmounta-
ble legal obstacles.2
As has been the case in other countries, Argentina structured
the legal protection of software on the basis of copyright law. The
initial position taken by government and scholarly authorities
was that the very broad terms of the definition of protected subject
matter under the Argentine Copyright Law3 ("ACL") were enough
to include software under the provisions of such law. The pecu-
liarities of software - the fact that it implies a set of instructions
to a machine, its functional properties, etc. - were considered not
to jeopardize the applicability of the Copyright Law to software. It
soon became apparent, however, that traditional copyright law did
not deal with certain aspects of software. Consequently, specific
regulations were issued to address the registration of software for
purposes of copyright protection.4 This proved to be insufficient
due to the fact that Argentine courts considered the criminal law
provisions of the ACL inapplicable in regards to certain software
infringements.5 Criminal law, in civil law systems such as Argen-
tina's, does not allow the type of flexibility that permits the exten-
sion of general private law rules to new technological areas.
Hence, it became necessary to amend the ACL so as to adapt it to
software protection.6
Similar developments have taken place in the area of Internet
law. With the exception of domain name protection, an area in
which it became immediately clear that a special regulatory
framework was necessary, the methodology used by Argentine law
has been, initially, to apply preexisting rules and concepts to the
issues created by the Internet. In some areas, such as contracts
and torts, these were the rules included in the Civil Code, dating
back to the 19th century. In other areas, such as patent and copy-
right law, more specialized statutes have been adapted, with rela-
tive success, to Internet issues.
This initial methodology has rapidly shown its limitations.
Certain private law rules are basically incompatible with the
needs of Internet transactions. Thus, for example, contract forma-
tion under Argentine law is based on the execution of written doc-
2. With regard to software law in Argentina see HoP~cio FERNANDEZ DELPECH,
PROTECCION JURfDICA DEL SOFTWARE (Abeledo Perrot ed., 2000).
3. Law No. 11723, Sept. 30, 1933, as amended 1989 [hereinafter ACLI.
4. In particular see Decree 165, Feb. 3, 1994, [1994-A] E.D.L.A. 241.
5. See DELPECH, supra note 2, at 17-18.
6. These amendments were made by Law No. 25036, Nov. 6, 1998, [LVIII-E]
A.D.L.A 5040.
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uments by means of the signature of the parties.7 Electronic
contracts and electronic signatures are not compatible with that
system, and therefore it has been necessary to introduce special
legislation to make such contracts and signatures legally viable.'
Also, since criminal statutes are narrowly construed, it is often
impossible to punish conduct that is nothing but "normal" crimi-
nal conduct pursued by means of the Internet.9
Reaction to these shortcomings of the preexisting legal struc-
ture has been less than swift. In some cases, such as electronic
contracts and signatures, only after years of having these transac-
tions frustrated by the absence of adequate rules have the neces-
sary statutory instruments been put in place. In other areas, such
as crimes committed through the Internet and Internet financial
transactions, the necessary statutory adjustments have not yet
been made and the resulting gaps cannot be covered by judge-
made law or administrative regulations.
The result of this peculiar road of development taken by the
law of Internet in Argentina is far from satisfactory. In some
areas, such as torts committed by means of the Internet, the basic
statutory system is flexible enough so as to accommodate most of
the situations created by Internet activity. In others, such as
domain names, electronic contracts and digital signatures, the
necessary statutory changes have taken place and there is no
insurmountable barrier between the statutory framework and
business needs. Finally, there are aspects of Internet activity in
which the existing statutory rules do not create a minimum basis
for such activity, regardless of the diligence of courts and adminis-
trative agencies. Such is the case in connection with computer
and Internet crimes,"° financial transactions1' and to some extent
copyright protection," among other areas of Internet law.
7. See C6D. Civ., art. 1193.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See DELPECH, supra note 2, at 149.
10. Under general principles of Argentine law, crimes must always be defined by
statutes and the statutory definitions must be interpreted narrowly, not being
extensible to conduct analogous to that expressly punished by the criminal laws.
11. Financial activities are highly regulated in Argentina. Banks cannot extend
their activities to new areas without prior regulations allowing such extension. The
regulatory framework for the expansion of Internet banking has not yet been put in
place. See G. Cabanellas, Banking Regulation in Argentina and the Treatment of
Foreign Banks, in M. GRusON & R. REISNER, 2 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS 1
(LEXIS Publishing, 2000).
12. Although the copyright laws are very broad in scope, the range of relations
that the Internet creates in connection with material protected by copyright is much
broader than in connection with pre-Internet material and it is not always possible to
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There are several reasons, common to most countries, why the
adjustment of the legal system to the Internet phenomenon has
been inadequate. The following may be noted:
a) The Internet is basically an international system. In this con-
text it is difficult to locate conduct in a given territory. Also,
the extent to which conduct in a given territory has effects in
other territories is much larger than in most legal areas.
Enforcing national legal rules in this context would require a
high degree of cooperation between different states for pur-
poses of legal harmonization,13 determination of the applicable
law and judicial and administrative enforcement. But in
Latin America in general, and in Argentina in particular, the
level of international cooperation in legal matters related to
the Internet is weak.
b) The Internet creates technological possibilities that fall
beyond the scope of preexisting laws. The methodology tradi-
tionally used by civil law countries to adjust to new social and
economic phenomena, namely using rules of such generality
that they may cope with basically any type of phenomena, has
worked fairly well in the past, particularly in areas such as
torts and contracts, but the technical changes implicit in the
Internet often fall beyond the generality of such rules. For
example, in spite of the very general terms of traditional con-
tract law, it is inadequate to address the issue of electronic
contracts.
c) The Internet creates special enforcement problems. Part of
these problems, for instance in the areas of gambling and
advertising, result from the international nature of the
Internet. Other issues are the consequence of the technologi-
cal possibilities created by the Internet. For example, certain
copyright infringements made possible by the Internet have a
potential detrimental effect on copyright owners which cannot
be matched by infringements made through the use of more
traditional means. Rules drafted to deal with such "tradi-
tional" forms of infringement lack effectiveness in the new
environment created by the Internet.
d) There is no strong constituency supporting the adaptation of
the legal system to the needs created by the Internet.
apply the copyright laws to the new relations created by the Internet; e.g., access to
Web sites as distinguished from copying material included in such sites.
13. Robert Kossick, The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities,
Developments and Challenges, 16 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1309, 1316 (2001).
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Employment generated by the Internet is low. The Internet
bubble and its aftermath have devastated Internet entrepre-
neurship. In the context of a rather unhappy experience with
globalization, foreign Internet companies have little or no lob-
bying power. Gross commercial protectionism in the United
States, the European Union and Japan has placed compliance
with the World Trade Organization agreements as a very low
priority of the Argentine government.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW OF THE
INTERNET IN ARGENTINA
The development of new legal areas in Argentina, as in other
civil law countries, may use different methodologies. One consists
of adapting preexisting legal concepts to new types of conduct or
transactions. The other implies creating a new set of legal con-
cepts adapted to a novel area of human conduct.
Sometimes both methodologies are used jointly. For example,
at the time in which the basic codes provided by the Argentine
Constitution were enacted, in the second half of the 19th century,
banking law hardly existed as such in Argentina. Argentina was
a backward, mostly illiterate agricultural country, with no bank-
ing system to speak of. Nowadays banking law is a major and
complex legal area. This is partly the result of adapting the rules
included in the basic codes mentioned above, and partly the result
of special statutes which use specific legal techniques and con-
cepts. A pledge, for instance, is a creature of the Civil and Com-
mercial Codes, and its effects are basically the same regardless of
whether the pledgee is or is not a bank. Deposit insurance, on the
other hand, only makes sense in the context of banks, and the spe-
cial rules applicable thereto only govern deposits made with
banks.
The law of the Internet follows this eclectic methodology.
Most of it is nothing but the adjustment of preexisting law - con-
tract, copyright, torts, and criminal law - to new phenomena.
Part of it - domain name regulation and electronic contracts - is
totally new, even if part of it is already integrated with the rest of
the Argentine legal system.
This eclectic methodology implies that the expression "law of
the Internet" has a meaning unlike that of expressions such as
"patent law" or "contract law." There is no general system of rules
on which the law of the Internet is built, peculiar to that legal
area. Under Argentine contract law, for instance, if an issue can-
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not be solved through the specific rules applicable to a given type
of contract, it is possible to go a step further in the level of abstrac-
tion of the rules being applied, resorting to the so called general
rules of contract law. There are even more general rules, applica-
ble to all types of legal transactions (actos juridicos), including
contracts.
Unlike contract law there is no general set of rules or princi-
ples applicable to the Internet as a whole. If, for example, a copy-
right question related to the Internet can not be solved with the
extant statutory or court rules, the solution will not be found in a
hypothetical general law of the Internet, but rather in general
copyright or intellectual property law.
Hence, the following Sections of this Article will examine the
different legal areas in which the Internet has had a significant
impact on Argentine law, without attempting to describe a possi-
ble, but to this day non-existent, general law of the Internet.
III. ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Under Argentine law, contracts must be entered into, in most
cases, in written form.14 In the absence of a written document, the
existence of a valid contract may be proved by other means only in
exceptional cases.1" Such cases include when it is practically
impossible to enter into an agreement in writing,16 or when per-
formance of the agreement has already begun, 7 or when there is
some written evidence regarding the agreement even if the agree-
ment as such has not been entered into in writing. 8 Under these
provisions it became practically impossible to enter into legally
enforceable electronic contracts, 9 since, pursuant to the Argentine
Civil Code system, a written document exists only if it is signed in
writing.2 °
The effects of these obstacles extended beyond the contractual
area. The written signature requirement applies to all documents
14. COD. Civ., art. 1193. An exception is provided with regard to contracts of less
than a certain value, but due to inflation such value is presently worthless.
15. COD. Civ., arts. 1191, 1192. Such exceptional cases include, inter alia,
situations in which it is practically impossible to enter into a written agreement, e.g.,
during a storm when certain valuable goods are immediately placed on a safe ship to
prevent destruction.
16. COD. Civ., art. 1192.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 251-52.
20. COD. Civ., art. 1012.
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and legal transactions, not just to contracts. Under the Argentine
Civil Code system there was practically no scope for electronic
documents. 1
Nevertheless, the Internet and other electronic means became
increasingly used in practice for contractual transactions, such as
purchases of consumer goods. Thus, it became clear that it was
necessary to introduce changes in the Civil Code system, so as to
lend full legal enforceability to electronic contracts and docu-
ments. Legislation was passed to this effect recognizing the exis-
tence and validity of electronic documents in certain areas,
particularly the federal public administration." The Digital Sig-
nature Law23 ("DSL") promulgated on December 11, 2001 granted
full legal recognition of electronic documents and signatures.
The central element of the DSL is the recognition of digital
signatures as valid signatures.24 This implies that a valid docu-
ment may exist in digital form25 if it is executed by means of a
digital signature.26 This in turn implies that contracts may be
entered in digital document form, executed by means of a digital
signature.27
"Digital signature" is defined by article 2 of the DSL as the
result of applying to a digital document a mathematical procedure
that requires information known exclusively 28 by and under the
absolute control of the person whose signature is being placed.
According to article 2, the digital signature must be verifiable by
third parties in such a way that the verification permits the simul-
taneous identification of the person whose signature has been
used and of any alterations made to the "digital document" to
which the signature refers after the signature is placed. A "digital
document" is defined by the DSL2 ' as "the digital representation of
actions or facts,30 regardless of the instrument used for its fixa-
21. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 251.
22. Law No. 24624, Dec. 29, 1995, [LVI-A] A.D.L.A. 59.
23. Law No. 25506, Dec. 11, 2002, [LXJI-A] A.D.L.A. 6 [hereinafter DSL].
24. DSL, arts. 1, 3.
25. DSL, art. 6.
26. DSL, art. 3.
27. With the exceptions provided by DSL, art.4. See infra text accompanying note
31.
28. "Exclusivity" in this context should not be destroyed by the fact that another
person has knowledge of the mathematical procedure described by article 2, provided
such information remains confidential. No case law exists as to this issue at this
stage.
29. DSL, art. 6.
30. Reference to "actions or facts" (actos o hechos) has legal significance since
these are basic concepts used by some of the most general provisions of the civil law.
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tion, storage or filing."
Certain documents and transactions are excluded by article 4
of the DSL from the possibility of execution by means of digital
signatures. This exclusion covers wills and other documents
related to decedent estates, transactions related to family law,
transactions of a strictly personal nature,31 and transactions that
are subject to formalities which are incompatible with the use of
digital signatures. This incompatibility may result from legal or
contractual provisions. It results from legal provisions when a
transaction must be entered into by means of a notarized deed. It
results from contractual provisions if an agreement has previously
required, for certain transactions, signatures or documents other
than digital signatures or documents.
The DSL includes a rebuttable presumption to the effect that
a digital signature corresponds to the person who is the owner of
the digital certificate which permits the verification of such digital
signature. 2  From this perspective, the DSL distinguishes
between digital signatures and electronic signatures. The latter
are defined as a set of integrated, linked or associated electronic
data, used as an identification medium, but lacking some of the
necessary legal elements to qualify as a digital signature.33 Elec-
tronic signatures do not create a presumption in favor of their
validity, and if the purported user denies their use, the burden of
proof as to the use of the electronic signatures bears on the per-
sons alleging such use.34
For a digital signature to qualify as more than an electronic
signature certain certification requirements must be satisfied. 5
First, a valid digital certificate referring to the user of such signa-
ture must be used during the period of validity. This digital certif-
icate is issued by an authorized certification agent and includes an
initial date along with a date of expiration 6.3  Second, the signa-
ture must be duly verified by means of a reference to the data
Thus, contracts are a type of "legal action" (acto juridico), and the provisions
applicable to "legal actions" are generally applicable to contracts.
31. These transactions are generally related to family law - e.g., adoptions - and
are therefore excluded by other provisions of article 4 of the DSL. Non-family law
transactions of a strictly personal nature include transactions related to the change of
name or legal capacity of an individual.
32. DSL, art. 7.
33. DSL, art. 5.
34. Id.
35. DSL, art. 9.
36. DSL, art. 15.
255
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2
included in the digital certificate. 7 Third, an authorized certifica-
tion agent must issue the digital certificate used for this
procedure."
Apart from the presumption of validity described above,39 a
digital signature has several specific effects. A digital document
bearing the digital signature of the sender of such document cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that the person whose signature
was used has sent the document.40 Digital documents bearing dig-
ital signatures are considered to be original documents, even if
they are the digital reproduction of other originals extant in digi-
tal or another form. 4' Furthermore, in the case of certain docu-
ments, files or data, the legal requirements are deemed satisfied
by use of digital documents bearing digital signatures. Such docu-
ments must be accessible for consultation and allow proper deter-
mination of their origin, purpose, and the date and time of their
creation, delivery and reception.42
The DSL provides the necessary conditions the digital certifi-
cates must meet for the existence of valid digital signatures. An
authorized certification agent must issue the digital certificates,
and they must comply with international standards, as deter-
mined by the Argentine authorities.44 Digital certificates must, at
least, identify with complete certainty the person the certificate
refers to and the certification agent; indicate their period of valid-
ity; be open to verification with respect to possible revocations;
distinguish clearly between verified and unverified information;
include the necessary information for the verification of the certi-
fied signature; and identify the certification policy under which
the certificate is issued.45 Certificates issued by foreign certifica-
tion agents are considered valid if they: comply with the require-
ments set by the DSL for digital certificates generally; the country
where the foreign certification agents operate grants reciprocal
treatment to Argentine certification agents; and the certificate
issued by the foreign certification agent is ratified by a local certi-
fication agent in addition to the Argentine authorities.46
37. DSL, art. 9(b).
38. DSL, art. 9(c).
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. DSL, art. 10.
41. DSL, art. 11.
42. DSL, art. 12.
43. DSL, art. 14(a).
44. DSL, art. 14(b).
45. Id.
46. DSL, art. 16.
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The identity and operations of the authorized certification
agents are defined and regulated by the DSL. Such agents may be
public or private entities.47 To operate as such they must be
authorized to do so by the Argentine authorities. 8 The certifica-
tion agents are subject to detailed regulations with regard to their
operations, including inter alia, confidentiality and technological,
informational, and filing obligations. 49 Although, certificates
issued by authorized certification agents are presumed to be valid,
they may be revoked for valid reasons, 5° and are not valid if used
for unauthorized purposes 51 or if they refer to transactions with a
value in excess of that for which the certificate is valid.52
The DSL also regulates the legal relationship between the
certification agent and parties whose digital signature is certi-
fied 3 by requiring, inter alia, that the parties using digital signa-
tures should maintain the exclusive control and confidential
nature of the data necessary for the use of such signatures. 4 The
relationship between the certification agent and the parties whose
digital signature is certified is governed by a contract and by the
legal regulations applicable to that relationship.
The certification agent is liable for the damages caused by
errors and omissions in the certificates issued by such agent, by
the lack of revocation in due time of such certificates, and gener-
ally, by the violation of such agent's obligations pursuant to the
legal regulations governing its activities.5" The certification agent
is not, however, liable in cases in which such liability has been
excluded in the certificates issued by such agent or in the terms
and conditions related to the use of such certificates, unless the
law imposes such liability.57 Also, the certification agent is not lia-
ble if certificates issued by such agent include misrepresentations
or inexact information based on data supplied by the person
whose signature is being certified, provided the agent has taken
reasonable steps to prevent such misrepresentations or inexact
47. DSL, art. 17.
48. Id.
49. DSL, art. 21.
50. DSL, arts. 19(e), 23(c).
51. DSL, art. 23(a).
52. DSL, art. 23(b).
53. DSL, arts. 24, 25.
54. DSL, art. 25(a).
55. DSL, art. 37.
56. DSL, art. 38.
57. DSL, art. 39(a), (b).
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information. 8
Although the DSL has implied a major improvement in the
legal environment for electronic contracts and electronic transac-
tions in general, it still leaves open a number of important issues
related to such contracts and transactions. The solution must be
found in the application of general contract law rules in conjunc-
tion with the provisions included in the DSL.
One of these issues relates to the existence of a contractual
offer or acceptance in cases in which the text of such offer or
acceptance originates in an electronic device not immediately acti-
vated by an individual. Before the DSL was enacted, doubts
existed regarding the legal effectiveness of such offers or accept-
ances. One solution proposed to overcome such doubts was to
enter into a written agreement, prior to the transmission of the
offer or acceptance, stating the legal effectiveness of the texts
originating in the electronic devices. 9 The DSL offers its own
solution to this problem, providing that these messages are legally
binding if they include the digital signature of the person to whom
the message is to be legally attributed."
Another difficulty concerns the determination of the moment
in which an electronic contract is legally perfected. Argentine con-
tract law provides two basic systems in this respect. One applies
to contracts between parties which are in immediate contact with
each other ("contratos entre presentes"). In these cases, the con-
tract is immediately perfected when both parties give their con-
sent to the agreed text of the contract.6 1 The second system
applies to contractual negotiations between parties which are not
in immediate contact with each other ("contratos entre ausentes").
In these cases, a contract becomes perfected if a party accepts in
full 62 the offer sent by the other party.' The acceptance may be
retracted up to the moment in which it becomes known by the
offeror,' but if the acceptance is not thus retracted, the contract
becomes retroactively valid as from the date in which the accept-
ance was sent to the offeror.65
Electronic contracts do not fit clearly into either of these two
58. DSL, art. 39(c).
59. See LORENZETrI, supra note 1, at 176.
60. See DSL, art. 10.
61. See COD. Crv., art. 1145.
62. See C6D. Crv., art. 1152.
63. See C6D. Crv., arts. 1152, 1154.
64. See COD. Crv., art. 1155.
65. See COD. Civ., art. 1154.
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contractual categories. A reasonable solution which has been pro-
posed for this categorization problem66 consists of applying the
rules on contracts between parties which are in immediate contact
to the case where there is instant interactive communications
between the parties leading to an electronic offer and an immedi-
ate electronic acceptance. In such cases, consent would not be
retractable. In the absence of such immediate communications,
the rules on contractual negotiations between parties that are not
in immediate contact with each other67 would be applicable.
A further legal issue in the area of electronic contracts relates
to whether a web site can constitute a contractual offer. The gen-
eral rule, under Argentine law, is that offers directed to the public
in general, and not to a specific offeree, are not offers from a
strictly legal point of view, but rather invitations for members of
the public to make contractual offers.68 This rule would apply to
web sites,6 9 to the extent that they do not result in an offer
addressed to a specific party.
Although normally there will be no legally binding electronic
contract in the absence of a digital document including a digital
signature, electronic communications which do not meet such
standards may have certain legal effects in connection with the
completion, performance or enforcement of contracts. The basic
principle under Argentine law is that all types of evidence are
admissible in connection with a conflict as to the existence of a
contract. 70 In this context, it would be admissible to use e-mails as
evidence of contractual negotiations or transactions. 71 The
requirement of written documents or of digital documents with
similar effects means that e-mails will normally not be sufficient
by themselves to prove the existence of a contract, but they may be
part of the evidence used to show such existence.72
Finally, reference should be made to the problem of determin-
ing the place of execution of electronic contracts. This determina-
66. See LORENZErrI, supra note 1, at 187.
67. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
68. See COD. Civ., art. 1148; CODIGO DE COMERCIO [COD. CoM.], art. 454.
69. See LORENZErri, supra note 1, at 187-88.
70. See COD. Crv., art. 1190.
71. See G., D.E. v. C. S.A.; Commercial Lower Court of the City of Buenos Aires
16, Decision of Oct. 23, 2001.
72. An additional problem, not clearly solved to this date by Argentine courts, is
how the existence of an e-mail is proved. In practice, several means are used to this
effect: expert witnesses, statements by notary publics, etc.
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tion has several implications in the area of conflict of laws. The
parties themselves may generally determine the place of execu-
tion in their agreement. 4 In the absence of a provision to that
effect, several positions are possible. One position is an under-
standing that the place of execution is the location of the party
who receives the acceptance of the contractual offer, since that
reception determines the existence of the contract. 5 Another
methodology consists of not locating the execution of electronic
contracts in any particular location by means of disregarding the
place of execution as governing the selection of the law applicable
to the contract.76 This second approach finds support in the vague
contents of the Argentine law rules governing the determination
of the applicable law in cases in which the parties are located in
different jurisdictions.7
IV. DOMAIN NAMES
The scope of this Article does not allow detailed analysis of
the legal issues posed by domain names under Argentine law. 8
The basic statutory rules and judicial precedents will be outlined.
The right to domain names in Argentina is acquired by means
of registration in a special registry known as NIC-Argentina. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of that registry, created by
the Domain Name Resolution ("DNR").79 Priority is determined on
the basis of the moment of filing the necessary application with
NIC-Argentina. s0 The application is filed by means of an elec-
tronic form, whose contents are determined by NIC-Argentina's
regulations.8 1
NIC-Argentina does not proceed to an analysis and determi-
nation of the rights of the person requesting a domain name regis-
tration. 2 NIC-Argentina's control over registration applications is
limited to certain aspects of such applications, namely whether
73. See Fernando Gago, Contrato en Internet, Ley Aplicable, Autonomia de la
Voluntad, [2000-C] L.L. 1053, 1054.
74. See LORENZETTI, supra note 1, at 200.
75. Id.
76. See Gago, supra note 73, at 1054.
77. See COD. Crv., art. 1214.
78. On the legal issues of domain names under Argentine law see DELPECH, supra
note 1, at 49.
79. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Res. 2226, Aug. 8, 2000, [LX-D] A.D.L.A 4283,
Basic Principles [hereinafter DNRI.
80. DNR, Rules of Registry, 1.
81. DNR, Rules of Registry, 2, 3.
82. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 69.
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identical registrations already exist and whether the domain
name is identical or confusingly similar to the name of public enti-
ties or international organizations. No control is made by NIC
with regard to the possible violation of other rights,84 such as
trademark, and the applicable regulations do not provide a proce-
dure under which third parties could file opposition against a
domain name registration application.85 Registration of domain
names has a one-year duration, and may be renewed
indefinitely.86
NIC-Argentina has no powers under the DNR to make deci-
sions regarding conflicts arising between different applicants or
between applicants and third parties. Likewise, it is not allowed
to act in such conflicts as mediator or arbiter.8 NIC-Argentina is,
however, invested with some degree of decision-making power,
since it must decide which applications to accept and to reject. In
this respect, NIC-Argentina may deny registration of a domain
name if it considers such domain name makes reference to a well-
known or publicly-recognized person, unless the authorization of
such person is included with the application.89
Domain name applicants must file a sworn affidavit stating
that the registration of such domain name does not infringe the
rights of third parties.9 ° In some cases, if such infringements
exist, NIC-Argentina has the power to deny registration or to
revoke an already existing application, particularly in the case of
domain names making reference to well-know or publicly-recog-
nized persons. 9' In other cases, it will be necessary to settle the
conflict before the courts.92
The DNR includes several rules excluding the liability of NIC-
Argentina in connection with the registration of domain names,
particularly in cases in which such registration infringes the
rights of third parties93 or causes other types of damages. 94 Given
the statutory status of the DNR, a regulation issued by the Minis-
83. See DNR, Basic Principles.
84. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 69.
85. Id.
86. DNR, Rules of Registry, 5.
87. DNR, Rules of Registry, 8.
88. Id.
89. DNR, Rules of Registry, 11
90. DNR, Rules of Registry, 12.
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92. DNR, Rules of Registry, 8.
93. DNR, Rules of Registry, 10.
94. DNR, Rules of Registry, 16, 17.
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try of Foreign Relations, the validity of these liability rules is at
least doubtful. However, if an infringement of third party rights
exists, the normal procedure is for the aggrieved party to obtain a
court order requiring changes in NIC-Argentina's registration,
and such registration will be modified accordingly.9"
Argentine law provides for the transferability of domain name
registrations. 6 The registration resulting from a transfer, how-
ever, is deemed to be a registration of a new domain name "for all
purposes."97 This could affect the rights of the registrants depend-
ing on the priority given as determined by the time of registration.
Conflicts between different domain names or between domain
names and other rights -such as rights related to personal names,
trade names, trademarks, etc. - are adjudicated by courts having
jurisdiction over such conflicts or through the relevant arbitration
mechanisms.9" Litigation and case law in this area are significant,
as illustrated by the following cases:99
a) In Byk-Argentina S.A. v. Estado Nacional,' ° registration of
the domain name byk.argentina.com.ar was objected to by the
Argentine government on the basis that use of the word
"Argentina" was reserved to public entities and of regulatory
provisions restricting the use of such word in domain
names.1"1 The Federal Court for Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters sustained a lower court decision which ordered registra-
tion of the aforementioned domain name, on the basis that the
applicant was previously the owner of the trade and corporate
name "BYK Argentina." While the Federal Court did not
invalidate the DNR, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' pow-
ers to enact such regulations were not attacked, the decision
does indicate that the DNR may not validly conflict with legal
rules which have a higher statutory status, such as those rec-
ognizing rights on trade and corporate names.
b) In Camuzzi de Argentina S.A. v. Arnedo, J.P.02 a preliminary
injunction was issued on the basis of Article 50 of the TRIPs
95. DNR, Rules of Registry, 15.
96. DNR, Rules of Registry, 19, 20.
97. DNR, Rules of Registry, 20.
98. See DNR, Rules of Registry, 8; DaLPECH, supra note 1, at 118.
99. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 97.
100. "Byk-Argentina S.A.," CNFed. Civ. y Com., Sala III [2000] L.L. 3.
101. See DNR, Rules of Registry, 7.
102. "Camuzzi de Argentina S.A.," Juzg. Fed. Civ. y Com. [1999] 4, cited in
DELPECH, supra note 1, at 102.
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Agreement 10 3 against registration of the domain name
camuzzi.com.ar. Plaintiff was the owner of the registered
trademark "Camuzzi Argentina." The court also allowed
plaintiff to use the aforementioned domain name, by means of
a registration with NIC-Argentina in plaintiffs name.
c) In Errepar S.A. c. Besana, G.A.104 a preliminary injunction was
issued, also on the basis of Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement,
against use of the domain name errepar.com.ar, based on the
existence of conflicting registered trademarks.
d) In In re Hotel Ava Miriva S.R.L. 10 5 a preliminary injunction
was issued allowing the owner of an unregistered trade name
to use it as a domain name and ordered the suspension of the
effects of a conflicting domain name registration. Thus, the
court extended protection from domain name use and regis-
tration to trade names, which under Argentine law do not
require registration for purposes of legal protection and
ownership. 6
e) In In re Marcelo Tinelli,17 defendants had registered the
domain name marcelotinelli.com. Marcelo Tinelli is a well-
known television personality. Although there was no regis-
tered trademark involved, a preliminary injunction was
granted in favor of Mr. Tinelli and the domain name was even-
tually transferred to him.
V. TRADEMARK AND TRADE NAME ISSUES RELATED TO
THE INTERNET
The active use of trademarks in the Internet creates multiple
legal issues, only some of which have been clearly dealt with by
Argentine law. There are practically no statutory rules on the
matter. The Argentine Trademark Law,0" dating from 1980,
includes no provisions on Internet practices.
One basic issue related to trademarks in the Internet is the
103. Law No. 24425, Dec. 23, 1994, [LV-A] A.D.L.A. 29 (Law No. 24425 enacted The
World Trade Organization's TRIPs Agreement).
104. Errepar S.A., Juzg. Fed. Civ. y Com. [1999] 3, cited in DELPECH, supra note 1,
at 105, 106.
105. In re Hotel Ava Miriva S.R.L., Juzg. Fed. de Rosario [20001 1, cited in
DELPECH, supra note 1, at 115.
106. See Law No. 22362, Feb. 1, 1981, [XLI-A] A.D.L.A. 58, arts. 27, 28.
107. In re Marcelo Tinelli, Juzg. Fed., cited in DELPECH, supra note 1, at 118.
108. Law No. 22362. With regard to trademark law in Argentina see Luis
EDUARDO BERTONE & GUILLERMO CABANELLAS, DERECHO DE MARCAS (1986); JORGE
OTAMENDI, DERECHO DE MARCAS (1999).
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determination of what constitutes trademark infringement in the
Internet context. Not all conduct related to a trademark, unau-
thorized by the trademark owner, constitutes a trademark
infringement. Argentine law distinguishes, in this respect
between trademark-like uses (usos marcarios) and non-trade-
mark-like uses (usos no marcarios).°9 Trademark-like uses are
those in which a trademark is used to distinguish a product or
service from other products or services, e.g., placing a trademark
on a given product.110 Non-trademark-like uses are those in which
a trademark is used in a manner other than to distinguish a prod-
uct or service from other products or services, e.g., where a trade-
mark is used to make derogatory statements about goods bearing
such trademark."' Trademark-like uses may result in trademark
infringements, which are subject to a special punitive regime and
a determination of which trademark owner has the right to cer-
tain special preliminary measures." 2 Non-trademark-like uses do
not strictly result in trademark infringements, but may be illegal
if they constitute unfair competition or if they otherwise violate
the trademark owner's rights, such as rights regarding such
owner's reputation or goodwill.'13
This distinction is especially relevant in the context of the
Internet, since many of the practices related to trademarks in
such context are non-trademark-like uses. The first instance of
this situation arises in cases of domain name registration applica-
tions. Such applications, and the registrations themselves, do not
imply a trademark-like use; no goods or services are immediately
identified. This has not prevented Argentine courts from
enjoining the registration or use of domain names, based on peti-
tions by trademark owners.' Courts have generally not stated
expressly or clearly the legal foundation of such injunctions. The
existence of registered trademarks has generally been considered
to be enough to prevent the registration of a domain name includ-
ing such trademarks.
Under general trademark law rules, however, there are limits
to the rights of trademark owners in the Internet context, which
may have effects in the future upon the possibility of preventing
109. See generally Guillermo Cabanellas, El Uso Atipico de la Marca Ajena, 3 TEM.





114. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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the registration or use of domain names on the basis of registered
trademarks. Thus, trademark registration does not create an
unlimited right with regard to the use of the registered trade-
mark, but rather an exclusive right related to certain goods and
services defined by such registration. Therefore, the owner of a
domain name could argue that such a domain name will be used
only in connection with goods and services not related to a preex-
isting trademark registration and that neither the domain name
nor the domain name registration will be used to infringe upon the
registered trademark owner's rights.
Argentine courts have not established the validity of this type
of argument, particularly because the litigation which has taken
place so far in the domain name-trademark interface area has
dealt with well-known trademarks. In this context, the courts
have reasonably concluded that the domain name registration was
illegal not only because it violated the rights resulting from trade-
mark registrations, but also because it violated other rights of the
trademark owner, such as its general goodwill and reputation and
its right to use its trademark in the Internet.'15 Also, courts have
correctly inferred an intention of the domain name owner to
appropriate for itself the prestige and customer-attraction power
of a well-known trademark.1 6
Another issue arises when the domain name is the trade or
corporate name of a person other than the domain name owner,
regardless of whether the domain name is also protected by trade-
mark rights. In such cases, the domain name registration creates
an obstacle to the proper use of the preexisting trade or corporate
name, since the owner of such name will be prevented from using
it in the Internet without confusion. Also, the domain name regis-
tration and use will create a degree of confusion as to the identity
of the person making such registration and use. Several types of
cases should be distinguished in this context:
a) In the case of domain names that include names of individu-
als, Argentine case law has protected individual names
against domain name registrations made without authoriza-
tion of the individual whose name was used. 17 However, the
cases decided so far have dealt with the name of public figures
so that the intention of appropriating the prestige of the indi-
vidual involved was clear. In cases not involving public
115. See generally DELPECH, supra note 1, at 102-106.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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figures, individuals would be protected by the rules on indi-
vidual names, which grant protection to the individuals
involved against unauthorized use of such names."8
b) In the case of domain names which include corporate names
that are normally used also as trade names, protection is gen-
erally possible on the basis of the protection granted to trade
names.119 If that were not the case, protection would still be
possible to the extent that use of a corporate name as a
domain name by an unauthorized person creates a potentially
significant level of confusion in the public. In addition, it frus-
trates the proper functioning of corporate names, and pre-
vents the rightful use of corporate names in the Internet.
c) In the case of trade names, such as names used to identify an
activity,2 ° the trade name owner has the exclusive right to use
such trade name in connection with the goods and services
and the market in which the identified activity takes place.' 2 '
However, once a protected trade name is identified as such,
registration of such trade name as a domain name may be pre-
vented without limits. Although courts have not been totally
explicit about the grounds for the extension thus granted to
trade names,'22 they appear to have taken into account the
need to prevent confusion as to the identity of the domain
name owner, as well as the need to allow the trade name
owner proper access to the Internet.
Another set of issues in the trademark-domain name inter-
face area relates to conflicts between similar but not identical
names. Trademark law has developed a complex system to deter-
mine the scope of protection granted to trademarks against simi-
lar but not identical trademarks. This system takes into account
several elements, such as the nature of the goods and services
involved, and the possibility of visual, audible or ideological confu-
sion, etc. In principle, this system would also be applicable to pos-
sible violations of trademark rights through the Internet and by
means of domain names. Domain names have certain special
characteristics, however, that should be taken into account when
determining the scope of trademark rights in the Internet. Thus,
domain names are generally not used in connection with specific
118. See Law No. 18248, June 10, 1969, [XXIX-B] A.D.L.A. 1420, art. 21.
119. See infra Part V.c.
120. See Law No. 22362, art. 27.
121. See Law No. 22362, art. 28.
122. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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goods or services, but rather are instruments that make possible a
continuous flow of information about multiple goods, services and
activities. The possibilities for consumer confusion in this context
are very different from those arising in more traditional forms of
trading.
Argentine courts have not yet settled other aspects of trade-
mark practices in the Internet area. In the case of meta-tag-
ging,23 an initial difficulty results from the fact that normally
such practice will not result in the identification of specific goods
or services. Therefore, there is no immediate violation of trade-
mark rights, since there is no trademark-like conduct. 124 How-
ever, as in other cases of non-trade-mark-like use of trademarks,
it will be possible to prevent this type of conduct to the extent that
it implies unfair competition, particularly if it deviates or dam-
ages the trademark owner's goodwill.
25
A similar situation arises with regard to linking. Links are
the connections between one Web page with a different Web page
by means of a hypertext reference. If trademarks are included in
the linked Web page, this will normally not result in a direct
trademark violation, since normally there will be no identification
of goods and services with such trademarks. 126 There may be
other illegal results, however, particularly if the linking results in
the possible deviation of goodwill or clients, or in the appropria-
tion of the trademark owner's efforts, and thereby creating a situ-
ation of unfair competition.
127
VI. PATENT LAW ISSUES RELATED TO THE INTERNET
Argentine Patent Law ("APL") is substantially less developed
than Argentine trademark law. 2  Likewise, statutory law is
123. F. LAWRENCE STREET & MARK P. GRANT, LAW OF THE INTERNET 4-96 (2002).
Street and Grant state: "Metatags are keywords that can be inserted into the source
code of Web sites. Search engines read metatag keywords and use them as references
for a Web site. You cannot view a Web site's metatags through ordinary viewing of a
site. However, you may be able to view them through Web browser functions .....
Id.
124. See Jos6 Massaguer, Conflictos de Marcas en Internet, 648 REV. GEN. DER.
11,107, 11,133 (Sp. 1998) (Spanish trademark law provisions are similar to those of
Argentine law).
125. See id. at 11,134.
126. Id. at 11,136.
127. Unfair competition claims require other elements unrelated to the practice of
linking in itself, such as the fact that defendant and plaintiff are competitors in the
same market, and that the practice has a significant possibility of deviating clients
from plaintiff to defendant. See C6D.PEN., art. 159.
128. Law No. 24481, March 20, 1996, as amended, [LV-D] A.D.L.A 5635
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poorly drafted and clearly biased against strong patent protection,
and case law is scarce and technically inadequate.
Several provisions of the APL bear on the issue of patentabil-
ity of technologies related to the Internet, namely:
a) Article 4 of the APL requires, as a condition for patentability,
that the invention be "susceptible of industrial application."29
"Industrial application" is a term of art, which, under Argen-
tine law requires that the patented technology should have
clearly identifiable physical elements or results, such ele-
ments or results being part of the patent claims.13 °
b) Article 6(a) of the APL declares that "mathematical methods"
are not inventions for purposes of this Law."'
c) Article 6(c) of the APL declares that "plans, rules and meth-
ods for the exercise of intellectual activities, for games or for
economic-commercial activities, as well as computer pro-
grams" are not inventions for purposes of this Law.1
32
These provisions have a highly restrictive effect on the pat-
entability of Internet-related technologies. In the case of software
used for the implementation of Internet activities, such software
is excluded from patentability by Article 6(c) of the APL, regard-
less of its inventive level or novelty. Under Argentine law, the
proper mechanism for the protection of software is copyright.
133
Patentability is not prohibited if software is part of a more com-
plex invention, provided such invention meets the "industrial
application" requirements described above.' Software technolo-
gies related to the Internet may satisfy these requirements when
they are related to hardware innovations.
With regard to business method patents, the language of the
APL is clearly contrary to their validity, since Article 6(c)
expressly prohibits "plans, rules or methods ... for economic-com-
mercial activities.' 3 Even in the absence of this express prohibi-
tion, business methods would not be patentable due to the
industrial application requirements discussed above.
136
[hereinafter APLI (the basic Argentine patent law statute). See GUILLERMO
CABANELLAS, DERECHO DE LAS PATENTES DE INVENCION (2001); CARLOS MARIA CORREA,
DERECHO DE PATENTES (1996).
129. APL, art. 4.
130. See APL, art. 4(e), for a definition of "industrial application" in this context.
131. APL, art. 6(a).
132. APL, art. 6(c).
133. See ACL, art. 1.
134. See CABANELLAS, supra note 128, at 819-20.
135. APL, art. 6(c).
136. See supra note 130, and accompanying text.
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VII. COPYRIGHT ISSUES RELATED TO THE INTERNET
Argentine copyright law has shown little adaptation to the
huge practical impact of the Internet on the content and effective-
ness of copyright. Although the principal Argentine copyright
statutes are generally broad enough to permit their use with
regard to new technological developments, this flexibility is not
infinite, as was shown in the case of software, which required an
amendment to the ACL to overcome certain limitations read into
the law by court decisions.
Argentine law does not have an express private use exemp-
tion.137 Criminal liabilities tend to apply only if intent to profit is
determined, 13 but this requirement generally does not apply for
purposes of determining civil liabilities.'39 Therefore, distribution
of musical or literary works through the Internet without the cop-
yright owners' authorization may constitute a civil infringement
by the persons downloading or using such works, 140 and a criminal
infringement by the person who, for profit, participates in the ille-
gal distribution of such works through the Internet.'
With regard to literary works, a distinction has been made
based on whether the work was included initially in the Internet
legally or not. If the work was included in the Internet by its
author or by a person deriving rights to the work from the author,
it may be understood that use of such work within the normal
bounds of the Internet is legal, since it must be deemed that such
use has been authorized by the author or by the person deriving
rights from the author. In this context, users may not only have
legal access to the work but they may also download it in printed
or electronic form, provided this is done within the limits of per-
sonal use.14 1 If, however, users exceed the limits of personal use,
and use downloading or other mechanisms to transmit the work to
third parties in electronic or other forms, this may be deemed to
exceed the implied authorization granted by the person who
legally included the work in the Internet.
4
1
In the case of non-duly authorized inclusion of a literary work
in a Web site, the person making such inclusion undoubtedly
137. See DELIA Lipszyc, DERECHOS DE AUTOR Y DERECHOS CONEXOS 223 (Ediciones
Unesco, Cerlac, Zavalha 1993).
138. See ACL, arts. 72, 72 bis.
139. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 191.
140. Id.
141. See ACL, art. 72 bis.
142. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 201.
143. Id.
269
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2
infringes the copyright owner's exclusive rights. The electronic
medium used for this purpose does not alter the identity of the
infringement since Argentine copyright law prohibits all types of
infringements of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, regardless
of the medium or instrument used.' The situation of users of
such illegally reproduced works is less clear. If use involves trans-
mission of the work to third parties, this will be a tort or a crimi-
nal copyright violation, since such use cannot be placed in a better
legal position than that derived from works legally introduced into
the Internet. 4 , If use does not involve transmission of the work to
third parties, the existence of civil or criminal liabilities for the
user will depend on whether such user acted with good or bad
faith, such as with knowledge regarding the illegality of the inclu-
sion of the work in the Internet.
Certain aspects of the methodology of Argentine copyright
law may facilitate the solution of certain problems created by the
Internet-copyright interface under other legal systems. Such is
the case, in particular, of the low significance of the concept of fix-
ation under Argentine copyright law. Fixation is not legally
required for either the existence of a work protected by copy-
right 4 6 or for a copyright infringement. 147 Thus, fixation cannot be
validly argued under Argentine law so that a work susceptible of
copyright protection may be used or copied because it only has an
"evanescent"48 existence on a screen, a random access memory or
other electronic instruments, or because it has been copied or used
by similar "evanescent" means. Therefore, since a copyright
owner has an exclusive right to use and reproduce material pro-
tected by copyright,'49 this exclusive right would extend against
use and reproduction through electronic means such as the
Internet.
Copyright includes, under Argentine law, the exclusive right
with regard to the public performance and display of protected
works.' 50 The rules in this respect are broad and abstract enough
to include, as copyright violations, displays in Web pages and
other public transmissions through the Internet. The fact that the
144. See ACL, arts. 1, 71.
145. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 201.
146. See Lipszyc, supra note 137, at 68.
147. See ACL, arts. 1, 71.
148. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52-53 (1976) (noting legislative history of U.S.
copyright statutes pertaining to the use of the word "evanescent").
149. See MIGUEL ANGEL EMERY, LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 65 (Astrea 1999).
150. See ACL, art. 2.
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"public" is not physically present with occasion of the "perform-
ance" or display should not alter the applicability of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights in these cases.
With regard to Internet transmissions, the breadth of a copy-
right owner's exclusive right under Argentine law - covering dis-
posal, publication, and "any form of reproduction," among other
rights15' - makes the possibility of a valid Internet transmission
without the copyright owner's authorization unlikely or impossi-
ble. Hence, no need has arisen in this context for a separate "right
of transmission."
Alternatively, the issue of implied licenses is not as well set-
tled. Such licenses are undoubtedly effective,'52 as was indicated
above in connection with certain possible copyright infringe-
ments.'53 However, once it is admitted that implied licenses are
valid, specific difficulties may arise, particularly in connection
with limitations applicable to the implied licenses, especially in
consumer transactions. Thus, if an implied license, such as in the
context of consumer transactions, includes restrictions on consum-
ers rights supported by public policies,'54 or if it limits the warran-
ties legally provided in favor of consumers, 5 or if it otherwise
limits consumer rights protected by consumer protection law,"6
the license may be considered valid, but the inadmissible clauses
or provisions shall be considered void. 15'
Although in principle it is possible to overcome the limitations
on the effectiveness of provisions attached to implied licenses by
means of adequately drafted express licenses, in practice this is
not the case due to the difficulties in meeting the conditions neces-
sary for binding electronic contracts in the context of copyright
licenses related to the Internet.
VIII. PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET
There are several statutory provisions of Argentine law that
bear on the scope of privacy rights in the Internet. Some such
provisions are as follows:
a) Article 1071 bis of the Civil Code provides that any person
151. Id.
152. See LORENZETTi, supra note 1, at 205.
153. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
154. See Law No. 24240, Sept. 22, 1993, as amended, [LIII-D] A.D.L.A. 4125, art.
37(a), (b) [hereinafter CPL].
155. Id.; See also LORENZErri, supra note 1, at 252.
156. CPL, art. 37(a), (b).
157. See CPL, art. 37.
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who arbitrarily intrudes into another person's life, publishes
portraits, publicizes correspondence, mortifies another person
with regard to one's habits or feelings, or otherwise damages
his or her intimacy, shall be forced to cease such activities and
to indemnify the damages caused.15
b) The Criminal Code includes various provisions punishing
libel, slander and defamation.'59
c) The Argentine Copyright Law provides that the photograph of
a person may not be the subject matter of commerce without
the express consent of that person. 160 In the event that the
person is deceased, the law requires consent from the
deceased's spouse and son(s) or direct descendants, or in their
absence, from the deceased parents.16 1 Consent may be
revoked if any damages caused by such revocation are indem-
nified. Personal letters are also granted a similar protection
because the right to their publication belongs to the author.
62
However, no consent is necessary when the use of protected
attributes appears in a publication related to scientific, educa-
tional or cultural purposes, nor is consent necessary in rela-
tion to facts or events of public interest or that have taken
place in public. 3
d) Article 21 of the Law of Names 6 4 prohibits the use of a physi-
cal person's name, including the malicious use of the name to
designate a fictitious character or thing, without that person's
consent. 165 According to Article 21 of the Law of Names, if a
person's name is used by another person for the latter's desig-
nation, the person entitled to the name may obtain damages
and an injunction against further illegal uses of the name
involved. Additionally, Article 23 of the Law of Names pro-
vides similar protection for pseudonyms. 66
e) Law 25,326 provides a general system of protection for per-
sonal data, regardless of the means used for the storage or
treatment of such data. 67 Thus, protection extends to data
158. See Maria Delia Pereiro, El Derecho a la Intimidad en el C6digo Civil y su Raiz
en el Articulo 19 de la Constituci6n Nacional, [1990-A] L.L. 174.
159. See C6D. PEN., arts. 109, 110.
160. ACL, art. 31.
161. Id.
162. ACL, art. 32.
163. Id.
164. Law No. 18248.
165. Law No. 18248, art. 21.
166. Law No. 18248, art. 23.
167. Law No. 25326, Oct. 4, 2000, [LX-E] A.D.L.A. 5426, art. 1 [hereinafter PDPL].
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kept by either public or private entities. 168 This system pro-
tects the honor and privacy rights of both physical and corpo-
rate persons."9 The Personal Data Protection Law ("PDPL")
includes provisions as to the truthfulness of stored personal
data, the means that are admissible for the collection of such
data, the use to which such data may be put, the right of
access to such data, and the instances when the data must be
destroyed.17°
This complex legal system has multiple effects on the
Internet. Use of a person's name or image in the Internet without
that person's authorization is severely restricted. This restriction
is partially lifted when the person is publicly known and its name
or image is used for normal news coverage. 7 ' Even this use is lim-
ited, however, if the name or image of a public person is used mali-
ciously or in a way unrelated to the person's public activity.
172
Control by the employer of e-mails or other Internet material
to which the employee has access is a debatable issue.' 3 The
activities of certain employees, in banks for example, may be val-
idly subject to special surveillance by the employer for security
reasons. Private correspondence, however, is generally beyond
the employer's reach in the absence of special circumstances such
as those discussed above.'7 4 Confidentiality obligations and the
liabilities applicable to private correspondence, have been success-
fully applied to e-mails in commercial'7 and criminal 6 litigation.
Argentine law does not grant a direct action against such
practices as "spamming." However, the law grants some degree of
protection to the "victim" by granting the person included in a
database for marketing purposes the right to demand deletion
from the data base.'7 7 Alternatively, Article 27(1) of the PDPL
makes the use of "cookies" illegal,' if not authorized by the
Internet user subject to such use.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. PDPL, art. 4.
171. See ACL, art. 31.
172. For example, publishing the photograph of a politician on his death-bed. See
Ponzetti de Balbin, CSJN [1985-B] L.L. 114, 120.
173. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 231.
174. See infra notes 169- 170, infra, and accompanying text.
175. See G., D.E. v. C. S.A., supra note 71.
176. See Lanata, C.N.C.P. [2000], cited in DELPECH, supra note 1, at 23-33.
177. See PDPL, art. 27.
178. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 238.
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IX. CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENTS IN THE INTERNET
Argentine law shows two types of reactions towards criminal
infringements taking place in the Internet. One is to adapt preex-
isting criminal law provisions to the new realities created by the
Internet. For example, criminal provisions related to mail
offenses are applied to e-mails. 179 The second approach calls for
the enactment of rules specific to crimes committed in cyberspace.
In this way, the DSL s0 included a new Article 78 bis to the Crimi-
nal Code, extending the rules applicable to written signatures and
documents to digital signatures or documents. Furthermore, the
PDPL"8' has added two new articles in the Criminal Code, Articles
117 bis and 157 bis, both applicable to the inclusion of false infor-
mation in data banks and to the violation of the confidentiality of
these banks. The new laws extend to all types of data banks
including those in electronic form.
1 82
A broad array of additional criminal provisions have been con-
sidered to be applicable to conduct taking place through the
Internet.1 83 Some of these provision affect:
a) Slander, libel and defamation."" The Internet is a particu-
larly apt instrument for these types of conduct, and the Crimi-
nal Code provisions make no distinctions on the means
used."15
b) Trade or personal secrets.' The applicable criminal law pro-
visions are broad and make no distinctions on the type of doc-
ument by means of which secret information is kept or on the
mechanism used to have access to such information.
c) Obscene publications or corruption of minors."7 Although the
constitutional provisions on freedom of the press are fully
applicable in the Internet,"'8 the limits on obscene or cor-
rupting publication are also applicable therein. 89
179. See Lanata, supra note 176.
180. DSL, art. 51.
181. PDPL, art. 32.
182. See DELPECH, supra note 1, at 167-68.
183. Id. at 158; See also Antonio Coghlan & Alejandro Anderlic, When Web Content
is Illegal, INT'L INTERNET L. REV. 48 (2001).
184. See COD. PEN., arts. 109, 110.
185. Argentine case law has not yet decided the liability of Internet service
providers. The matter should be dealt with on the basis of general criminal law
principles, which would normally exclude the civil or penal liability of such providers.
186. See COD. PEN., arts. 153-56.
187. COD. PEN., arts. 125, 128.
188. See Executive Decree 1279, Nov. 25, 1997, [LVII-E] A.D.L.A. 5667.
189. See Coghlan & Anderlic, supra note 183, at 48.
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d) Fraud. 9 ° These are extremely broad in the Argentine Crimi-
nal Code and clearly permit their extension to activities in the
Internet.191
e) Instigation to criminal conduct and on race crimes. These are
also applicable to conduct taking place through the Internet.1
92
However, because criminal provisions must be construed nar-
rowly, significant sets of conducts, taking place through the
Internet, go unsanctioned. Activities such as spreading computer
viruses and "hacking," which cause the types of damage generally
punished by criminal sanctions often escape because of the inade-
quacy of the statutes in force. Argentine criminal law has not ade-
quately adjusted to the evolution of the Internet phenomenon.
190. C6D. PEN., art. 172.
191. See Delpech, supra note 1, at 161.
192. See Coghlan & Anderlic, supra note 183, at 48.
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